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Which biofuel market does the ethanol tariff protect? Implications for social welfare and 
GHG emissions 
 







The ethanol tariff is one of the instruments used by the government to encourage 
domestic ethanol production. Existing literature analyzing the market and welfare effects of the 
US ethanol tariff has concluded that removing the tariff would increase social surplus and reduce 
greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, due to the replacement of corn ethanol with lower cost and 
lower GHG intensive sugarcane ethanol. This paper re-examines these findings in the presence 
of a domestic cellulosic ethanol industry. The current RFS mandate requires 21  billion gallons 
of advanced biofuel, a portion of which could be met by any  non-starch based biofuel that 
reduces emissions by at least 50% compared to an energy equivalent amount of gasoline. 
Sugarcane ethanol has been classified as an advanced biofuel, and competes for market share 
with domestic advanced biofuels such as cellulosic ethanol. In addition, it also competes with 
corn ethanol for market share in the non-advanced biofuel market. The dual market for sugarcane 
ethanol raises the question of which domestic biofuel  market the tariff protects. Our results show 
that the effect of removing the tariff on social welfare and GHG emissions is ambiguous and 
depends on which biofuel market the tariff is protecting. If the tariff protects the corn ethanol 
market, its removal increases welfare and GHG emissions. However, if the tariff protects the 
cellulosic ethanol market, removing the tariff could increase emissions. Whether the tariff 
protects either the corn ethanol or cellulosic ethanol market, or both depends on the relative costs 
and supply elasticities of the three types of biofuel.  In general, the removal of the tariff leads to 
an increase in social surplus, although in some cases, such as when the excess supply elasticity of 
sugarcane ethanol is not very elastic, net welfare could decrease when the tariff is removed. 
Removal of the tariff also reduces the share of domestically produced fuel, and this effect is 
greater when the tariff is protecting both the cellulosic and corn ethanol markets, i.e. the removal 
of the tariff causes a reduction in the production of both biofuels. 
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Which biofuel market does the ethanol tariff protect? Implications for social welfare and 
GHG emissions 
 
Christine Crago and Madhu Khanna 
 
 
Motivations for biofuels include energy security, energy independence and climate 
change mitigation. To achieve these objectives, policy support in the form of mandates, subsidies 
and tariffs have been established, with the mandates and subsidies encouraging a shift towards 
cellulosic biofuels and the tariff limiting imports of sugarcane ethanol that could compete with 
corn ethanol or advanced biofuels. While these objectives are generally complementary, there 
could be some trade-offs between them. For example, the goal of energy independence that 
motivates greater domestic production of biofuels and limitation of imports through a tariff could 
also  lead  to reduced social surplus and increased emissions.  We explore these trade-offs in 
biofuel policy objectives in the context of the existing renewable fuel standard (RFS) and ethanol 
tariff.  
 
Existing literature analyzing the market and welfare effects of the US ethanol tariff have 
concluded that removing the tariff would increase social surplus and reduce GHG emissions, due 
to the replacement of corn ethanol with lower cost and lower GHG intensive sugarcane ethanol. 
This paper re-examines these findings in the presence of a domestic cellulosic ethanol industry. 
The Energy Independence and Security Act (EISA) sets annual renewable fuel standard (RFS) 
consumption mandates beginning in 2008 that reaches 36 billion gallons by 2022. The use of 
corn ethanol has been capped at 15 billion gallons due to concerns about the effect of starch 
based ethanol production on food prices. “Advanced biofuels,” defined as those that decrease 
GHG emissions by more than 50% compared to gasoline make up the rest of the mandate, and 
within that category, 16 billion gallons have to come from cellulosic biofuels and 1 billion from 
biodiesel. The non-cellulosic and non-biodiesel portion of the mandate account for 4 billion 
gallons and this portion of the mandate could be supplied by sugarcane imports, which have been 
categorized as an advanced biofuel by the US Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)  (EPA 
2010).    Depending on the cost of producing cellulosic ethanol in the next several years, 
sugarcane ethanol could be the primary source of non-cellulosic advanced biofuel. Sugarcane 
ethanol also competes with corn ethanol for market share in the traditional biofuels market. 
 
Historically, the US  has  imported  sugarcane ethanol primarily from Brazil and other 
countries that are part of the Carribean Basin Initiative (CBI). Sugarcane imports from Brazil are 
subject to an ad-valorem tariff  of 2.5% and a secondary tariff of $0.54 per gallon while imports 
from CBI enter tariff-free. 
1
                                                 
1 Countries that have exported ethanol under the CBI tariff exemption include: Costa Rica, El Salvador, Jamaica, 
Trinidad and Tobago.  
 Part of the tariff on Brazilian ethanol is meant to offset the $0.45 per 
gallon volumetric tax-credit given to blenders of ethanol, regardless of its source. However, 
given the lower tax credit, the net tariff has always been positive; in 2010 the net tariff was $0.3 
per gallon. The existence of the tariff is viewed as a limiting factor in the expansion of imports 
from Brazil. If the advanced biofuel requirement of the RFS  necessitates  more imports  of 4 
 
sugarcane ethanol, the US could be foregoing welfare gains by keeping the tariff in place. In 
addition to changes in social surplus, changes in imported quantities of sugarcane ethanol could 
also affect GHG emissions from fuel use. If sugarcane ethanol displaces corn ethanol, GHG 
emissions could decrease because sugarcane ethanol is 52% less GHG intensive  than corn 
ethanol.  On the other hand, if sugarcane imports replace domestic advanced biofuels from 
cellulosic ethanol, emissions could increase because cellulosic ethanol is 115% to 133% less 
GHG intensive than sugarcane ethanol. 
 
The dual market for sugarcane ethanol raises the question of which biofuel market/s 
would be affected by increased ethanol imports and removal of the ethanol tariff.  Whether 
imported ethanol would displace corn ethanol, or would be used primarily to fulfill the advanced 
biofuel requirement would have an impact on the share of domestic biofuel production, the 
welfare effect of the RFS, and GHG emissions of the resulting fuel mix.   
 
In this study, we present a framework for identifying market conditions under which 
ethanol imports would affect both corn ethanol and advanced biofuel markets, or only the market 
for advanced biofuel.  We quantify market and welfare effects, the share of domestic fuel 
production, and GHG emissions of the RFS mandate in 2022, with and without an ethanol tariff. 
Moreover, to account for uncertainty in future states of the biofuel market, as well as parameter 
assumptions, we provide a range of estimates for our results. 
 
II. Review of Literature 
 
Several studies have examined the market implication of removing the US ethanol tariff. 
Elobeid and Tokgoz (2008) examine the effect of the US ethanol tariff and tax credit on ethanol 
markets in the US and Brazil.  They found that the tariff restricts ethanol imports from Brazil and 
that removing the tariff would significantly decrease domestic ethanol price in the US (by 14%) 
and more than double ethanol imports.  Elobeid and Tokgoz (2008) assume that the price of 
Brazilian ethanol is lower than the US price and that importing sugarcane ethanol displaces corn 
ethanol. de Gorter and Just (2008) examine the impact of the tariff in the presence of a tax credit 
and mandate and concluded that without a binding mandate, the tariff has a significant impact on 
the world price of ethanol, but only has a small impact on domestic ethanol prices. However, 
with a binding mandate,  imposing a tariff will lead to a greater increase in domestic ethanol 
prices, because the reduction in imports will have to be offset by increased domestic production 
in order to meet the mandate.  The above studies consider corn and sugarcane ethanol markets, 
but not the market for advanced biofuels. Thompson et al. (2009) acknowledge that sugarcane 
ethanol may be used to fulfill the advanced biofuel mandate, and would be used first to fulfill the 
advanced biofuel requirement before it is used to replace domestically produced corn ethanol. In 
the presence of the RFS mandate, they show that the effect of the tariff depends on oil prices 
which determine whether or not the RFS mandate is binding. They find that the ethanol tariff has 
a modest impact on domestic ethanol production (and corn prices) when demand exceeds the 
mandate.  
 
We extend the literature analyzing the market and welfare effect of the ethanol tariff to 
account for the presence of a domestic cellulosic biofuel industry and the dual market for 
sugarcane ethanol. Our representation of the biofuel market accounts for the cellulosic mandate 5 
 
which is a subset of the total advanced biofuel mandate, and the cap on traditional biofuel. Our 
model has some similar features to the model by Thompson et al. (2009) but instead of focusing 
on the impact of removing the tariff on the corn market, we focus on the social surplus and 
externality impacts. In addition, we explore the impact of technological improvements and 
learning on future costs of biofuels. We also model ethanol trade using a more recent data on 
quantities of ethanol traded and its price. Previous commentaries and studies such as Elobeid and 
Tokgoz and de Gorter and Just support the widely held belief that the US import tariff restricts 
ethanol trade and that removal of the tariff would displace corn ethanol with sugarcane ethanol.   
However, recent cost studies (Crago et al., 2010, Gallagher et al., 2006) and trade data (see 
Figure 1) show that sugarcane ethanol from Brazil could be more costly than corn ethanol even 
without the tariff. Figure 1 shows the trend in the cost of ethanol imports at the port versus US 
wholesale ethanol price. Before 2006, US ethanol wholesale prices were for most part higher 
than the cost of CBI or Brazilian imports (even with the tariff). In 2007 and 2009, US wholesale 
prices were higher than that of CBI imports, but not Brazilian imports without the tariff. Most 
recently in 2010, US domestic wholesale prices of ethanol are lower than either CBI or Brazilian 
imports even without the tariff that applies to Brazilian imports. 
 
Recent trade data also shows a sharp decline in imports from Brazil. Figure 2 shows the 
trend in US ethanol imports. Before 2004, imports of ethanol mostly came from CBI countries. It 
was not until 2004 that large amount of exports were sources from Brazil. The MTBE ban and 
the first RFS were  enacted around 2005, which increased ethanol demand in the US, thus 
prompting significant imports of ethanol. However, domestic production capacity quickly scaled 
up, and by 2009 imports were down to pre-RFS1 levels, and in 2010 imports were less than 
0.05% of total consumption. Imports from Brazil have declined significantly from its peak of 400 
million in 2006 down to a negligible 78,6700 in 2010. CBI imports remained at a relatively 
steady level from 2005-2009 but also dropped significantly to 5 million in 2010. A large portion 
of ethanol from CBI is produced by importing hydrated ethanol from Brazil and dehydrating the 
ethanol in the CBI country – thus meeting the requirement of “substantial transformation” for 
tariff exemption. Thus, tighter supplies of ethanol from Brazil could also limit CBI imports.  
 
Even if imports have decreased, the demand for imports notwithstanding higher prices 
suggest that the US still need these imports, most likely to augment the gap between domestic 
production and mandated quantities of advanced biofuels. Given the dependence of CBI 
exporters on Brazilian feedstock or hydrated ethanol, expansion of sugarcane ethanol production 
in the future would largely depend on the expansion of sugarcane and ethanol production in 
Brazil. However, recent price and trade data suggests that Brazil may not be able to meet the 
demand as easily as previously expected, or demand would be met but at a higher cost. If the 
tariff were to be removed to encourage more imports, the degree to which sugarcane imports 
could expand would depend on the elasticity of Brazil’s excess supply curve for sugarcane 
ethanol. In our analytical and numerical model, we explore the impact of different excess supply 
elasticities of Brazilian ethanol on the US market for fuel in 2022. 
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III. Analytical Model 
 
 
We use an open market partial equilibrium model of the US fuel market, with gasoline 
and biofuel (corn, sugarcane and cellulosic ethanol) as fuel alternatives. We model gasoline and 
biofuel trade with the rest of the world. The equilibrium in the fuel market is denoted by: 
 
DF (PF, tF) = SG
D(PF) + SG
M (PF)  + SC (PC,tC) + SCL(PCL, tCL)  + SB(PS,t, tC)  + SJ (PS,t,tC)    (1) 
 
where DF is the total demand for fuel, SG
D and SG
M  are supplies of domestic and imported 
gasoline, and SC  and  SCL are  domestic supplies of corn and cellulosic ethanol. The last two 
terms in Equation (1) are  supplies of imported ethanol from Brazil (SB) and CBI countries (SJ).  
Quantities demanded and supplied are functions of prices and taxes, subsidies, or tariffs. The 
volumetric fuel tax is denoted by tF, t is the import tariff, and tC and tCL are tax credits for 
traditional and cellulosic ethanol, respectively.  
 
Because of the provisions of the RFS mandate, the following conditions also hold: 
 
QB
MAN ≤ SC + SCL + SB  + SJ 
 
QA
MAN ≤ SCL + SB  + SJ  if QC
CAP = SC  or  
 
QA
MAN ≤ SCL + ((SB  + SJ)  - (QC
CAP -  SC))  if QC











MAN is the total biofuel mandate, QA
MAN is the advanced biofuel mandate, QCL
MAN  is 
the cellulosic mandate, and QC
CAP  is the maximum allowed quantity of starch based (i.e. corn) 
ethanol.  
We assume that the ethanol and gasoline are perfect substitutes. Ultimately, the consumer 
buys fuel to produce miles. The consumer is indifferent about the type of fuel used to produce 
miles. However, the consumer is aware that a gallon of ethanol could only produce a fraction of 
the miles that could be produced from gasoline. Let λ be the ratio of the energy content of a 
gallon of ethanol and gasoline. The consumer is willing to pay an ethanol price (PE) of at most (λ 
PG), where PG is the price of gasoline. In addition, as noted by de Gorter and Just (2010) the 
consumer faces an additional penalty for purchasing ethanol because the fuel tax is levied on a 
per gallon basis. Thus, the consumer pays more tax per mile driven when they purchase ethanol. 
Using this representation, PE = λ PG + (1 – λ) tF, and PF = PG in equilibrium. Because the mandate 
is imposed on blenders (that is, they have to sell the mandated quantities at the pump), blenders 
bear the cost in the event that the producer price of ethanol is above the retail price of fuel. 
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Our interest is to examine the impact of removing the ethanol tariff in the presence of a 
mandate and a tax credit. The individual and combined effects of the mandate and the tax credit 
have been the subject of several previous studies (Ando et al. 2010;De Gorter and Just 2008;De 
Gorter and Just 2010). A comprehensive treatment of the interaction of these two policies, along 
with the tariff could be found in de Gorter and Just (2010). We devote the subsequent discussion 
on the primary focus of the paper, viz, the effect of the tariff.  
 
Assume that the RFS is binding, and that the cost of cellulosic ethanol is high enough 
such that it is unlikely that it could be competitive with corn or sugarcane ethanol, for reasonable 
production levels. As shown in Figure 3, the producer price of cellulosic ethanol is PCL, and the 
produced quantities are at QCL
MAN, equal to the cellulosic mandate. The production of corn 
ethanol is at the RFS cap (QC
CAP), and the producer price is PC




 The excess demand curve is kinked because there is a fixed demand of QB
T  = 
QA
MAN - QCL
MAN  which is the portion of the advanced biofuel mandate that could not be met by 
cellulosic ethanol production. If the US wants to fulfill the advanced biofuel requirement, it will 
import ethanol that would meet the remainder of the advanced biofuel mandate from Brazil, as 
long as its price is below P
CL. If in equilibrium, the price of sugarcane ethanol is lower than that 
of corn ethanol at the cap, additional ethanol will be imported in excess of QB
T. In this case, 
sugarcane ethanol is meeting the balance of the advanced biofuel requirement, while also 
competing for market share in the traditional biofuel category. 




NT is higher than PC
CAP, removing the tariff has no impact 
on domestic biofuel production except to increase the price of sugarcane ethanol imports. 
Contrast this to Figure 4, which shows the case with a more elastic excess supply of sugarcane 
imports. In the initial equilibrium with the tariff, imported ethanol is at QB
T, while the price is 
PB2
T. However, once the tariff is removed, the price of sugarcane ethanol drops to PC
NT, which is 
lower than PC
CAP. Without the tariff, sugarcane ethanol displaces corn ethanol and takes market 
share away from corn ethanol in the traditional biofuel market category.  
 
Now, let’s proceed to the case in which cellulosic ethanol could be competitive with corn 
and  sugarcane ethanol (either because corn and sugarcane ethanol is costly, or the cost of 
cellulosic ethanol production has gone down, or both). Figure 5 shows the supply curves of 
cellulosic, corn and sugarcane ethanol. The bold dotted line represents the advanced biofuel 
mandate. As mentioned earlier, a portion of the advanced biofuel mandate has to be met by 
cellulosic biofuel The bold, dashed line on the first panel represents the cellulosic ethanol 
mandate. To the left of MCEL, production of cellulosic ethanol is fixed at that amount. To the 
right, production can exceed MCEL, and is given by the cellulosic ethanol supply curve 
(SCELLULOSIC). The middle panel shows the total domestic supply and demand curves of corn and 
advanced biofuel, where advanced biofuel refers to cellulosic production in excess of MCEL. 
 
The third panel shows the excess supply of sugarcane ethanol from Brazil, as well as the 
excess demand of advanced and/or corn ethanol. Note that only US cellulosic production can 
meet the cellulosic ethanol mandate, which is why the excess demand is for advanced or corn 
                                                 
2 In the numerical simulation, we separate trade with CBI countries, and Brazil where only Brazilian imports are 
levied the tariff. 8 
 
ethanol only. Note that in contrast to Figures 3 and 4, the excess demand curve has no vertical 
portion. This is due to the presence of a competitive cellulosic ethanol industry which could also 
supply advanced biofuel.  
 
With the tariff in place, cellulosic ethanol production is at QCL
1 = MADV, which means 
that it is meeting both the cellulosic mandate, as well as the total advanced biofuel mandate. 
Corn ethanol is also at its cap.  If the tariff is  removed, sugarcane ethanol displaces  both 
cellulosic and corn ethanol, so that cellulosic ethanol decreases to just meeting the cellulosic 
ethanol mandate, and corn ethanol production falls below the cap. 
 
Based on Figure 5, the tariff protects only the corn ethanol market if the equilibrium price 
(P*) upon removal of the tariff is lower than the marginal cost of corn ethanol at the cap. i.e. P* 
< PC
CAP. The tariff protects only the cellulosic ethanol market if P* > PC
CAP and P* < PCL
 
(QA
MAN). Lastly, the tariff protects both corn and cellulosic ethanol market if P* < PC
CAP and  
PCL
 (QCL





To see the effect of behavioral parameters such as supply elasticities on the likelihood 
that sugarcane imports will affect either or both the corn ethanol and advanced biofuel industry, 










where Si  and Pi, i = C ,S, CL are supply curves and prices  for corn, sugarcane and cellulosic 
ethanol  respectively, and   γ,  α  and  σ  are supply elasticities.  Imports of sugarcane ethanol 
classified as advanced biofuel are positive if the equilibrium price (P*) is less than the marginal 
cost of cellulosic ethanol at the mandated advanced biofuel quantity. This means that at P* = PCL
 
(QA
MAN) , SS(P*) is positive. 
 













 σ >                     (2) 
 
Equation (2) implies that the likelihood of sugarcane ethanol affecting the advanced biofuel 
market is increased by (1) a greater sugarcane supply elasticity (2) a smaller cellulosic biofuel 
elasticity and (3) a greater mandated quantity of advanced biofuel. 
 
 
Imports of sugarcane ethanol classified as traditional biofuel are positive if   the 
equilibrium price is lower than the price of corn ethanol at the cap. This means that at P* = 9 
 
PC
CAP, the supply of sugarcane ethanol after meeting the advanced biofuel requirement is 
positive. This condition can be expressed as: 
 
SS(PC















 α >0              (3) 
 
Equation (3) implies that the likelihood of sugarcane ethanol affecting the corn ethanol market is 
increased by (1) a greater sugarcane supply elasticity (2) a greater cellulosic biofuel supply 




IV. Numerical Simulation 
 
To assess the magnitude of the impact of the tariff along with other existing policies, we 
conduct a numerical simulation. Using 2009 data to calibrate the model, we project the situation 
in the US fuel market in 2022. The following scenarios are evaluated: No Policy, Mandate with 
tariff and tax credit for traditional and cellulosic biofuel, Mandate with tax credit for traditional 
and cellulosic biofuel (no tariff), and Mandate with tax credit for cellulosic biofuel (no tariff and 
traditional biofuel tax credit). 
 
In defining supply elasticities, it is important to distinguish between short run and long 
run estimates. Because of our forward looking analysis, we use long run elasticities. The short 
production period and constant structural changes in the biofuel market have constrained 
rigorous econometric estimation of supply and demand elasticities for biofuel markets. Gallagher 
et al. (2003) reported a value of 1.5 for corn supply elasticity. More recently, Miranowski (2007) 
reported short-run elasticities of demand and supply to be -0.89 and 0.29 respectively. From this 
Gardner (2007) used a range of 1 to 5 for the long run supply elasticity. Following Gardner, we 
assume a long-run elasticity of 3 for corn and cellulosic ethanol, and perform sensitivity analysis 
using a range of 1 to 5. For the supply elasticity of imported sugarcane ethanol, Lee and Sumner 
(2010) estimate the short run elasticity to be 2.7. For the long run, we assume a value of 30 and 
test sensitivity using lower values of 3 and 10.  For CBI countries, we assume that the excess 
supply elasticity is 3. CBI production is capacity constrained and relies mostly on Brazil for 
feedstock supply  (Petrojam Ethanol 2007;Yacobucci 2008). Thus if the tariff were to be 
removed, most sugarcane imports is likely to come directly from Brazil.  
 
About half of petroleum derived motor fuel consumed in the US is imported, while the 
rest is produced domestically  (DOE 2010). Thus, we have two supply curves for gasoline: 
domestic and imported. For domestic gasoline supply, we use a long run elasticity of 0.4, based 
on estimates reported by Green and Ahmad (2005). Most recent estimates ranged from 0.2 to 0.6. 
The import supply elasticity of oil facing the US is determined both by the response of oil 
suppliers, and net importers of oil in the rest of the world (Leiby 2008). Leiby (2008) report that 
when the net effect of these two responses are taken into account, the import supply elasticity of 
oil lies between 4.3 to 18, with a 90% Confidence Interval and a mean of 8.9. Thus, we thus use 
a value of 9 for the supply elasticity of imported gasoline. For fuel demand elasticity, we use the 10 
 
estimate for gasoline demand of -0.4, with a range of -0.2 to -0.6 following previous literature 
(Greene and Ahmad 2005;Parry and Small 2005).  
 
We also use 2009 market data to calibrate the model. Ethanol and gasoline prices are 
$1.79 and $1.76 per gallon (Omaha wholesale free-on-board average rack price) (NEB 2011).  
The cost of sugarcane ethanol from Brazil at the US port without tariff is $1.8 per gallon, while 
for sugarcane ethanol from CBI countries, the cost is $1.9 per gallon. A markup of $0.30 per 
gallon and taxes of $0.38 per gallon are added to get the retail prices of ethanol and gasoline. 
There is no reliable market data for the cost of cellulosic ethanol at the moment, since 
commercial production does not yet exist. Using the cost of feedstock from grasses and other 
cellulosic material, as well as projected processing costs, some studies have estimated the cost of 
producing cellulosic ethanol in 2022 (Khanna 2008;Chen 2011). We use a range of $2-$4 per 
gallon, with a central value of $3 for the cost of cellulosic ethanol is 2022, assuming that 
production levels are in line with the mandate.  
 
In 2009, 10.6 B gallons of ethanol was produced (RFA 2011). RFA also reports that total 
ethanol imports for the same year are 0.13 B gallons which brings total demand to 10.73 B 
gallons. According to the US ITC, of the 13 million in ethanol imports, 4 million were from 
Brazil, and the rest were from CBI countries, primarily Jamaica (USITC 2011).  According to the 
Energy Information Administration, total gasoline consumed in 2009 was 125 B gallons (EIA 
2011). The US Federal Highway Authority also reported that miles driven in 2009 was 3500 
billion miles (FHA 2011). 
 
In order to obtain estimates of the cost of fuel externalities, we assume that the marginal 
damage of a metric ton of carbon emission is $25,  based on Parry and Small (2005).  We set 
emissions intensities for the different fuels based on several sources, including  estimates used by 
the EPA in the RFS ruling.  Emissions intensity of gasoline from “well to wheel”  is 3.1 kg CO2 
per gallon or 93 kg CO2 per MJ. For corn ethanol, the emissions intensity is 1.3 kg CO2/gallon or 
58 kg CO2/MJ  while for sugarcane ethanol, the value is 0.5 kg CO2/gallon or  25 kg CO2/MJ. 
For cellulosic ethanol, we use the average for  miscanthus (-19.3 kg CO2/MJ or -0.4kg CO2/gal) 
and switchgrass  (-8.7 kg CO2/MJ or -0.2kg CO2gal) (EPA 2010;Khanna et al. 2011).  The 
emissions intensities above imply that for an equal energy content, corn ethanol emits about 37% 
less carbon than gasoline while sugarcane ethanol emits 73% less. Cellulosic ethanol reduces 
emissions by 109%.  
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 A. Results 
 
A.1 Market Effects 
 
Table 1 shows the simulation results using central estimates for model parameters, with 
varying  costs of cellulosic ethanol and learning rate for corn ethanol production. In 2022, with 
the mandate, tax credits, and tariff in place, and cost of cellulosic ethanol production at $3, 
domestic production of corn and cellulosic ethanol are at the mandated levels. Imports of 
sugarcane ethanol are at 3.81 billion, while imports from CBI countries are 19 million. Imports 
fill the gap between the total advanced biofuel mandate, and cellulosic ethanol production. With 
the removal of the tariff, sugarcane ethanol displaces domestic corn ethanol, which decreases 
37% to 9.43 billion gallons. Some CBI imports are displaced as well. Since sugarcane ethanol 
cannot meet the cellulosic mandate, cellulosic production stays at 16 billion. Removing the non-
cellulosic ethanol subsidy does not change the mix of fuels in the market but primarily affects 
government revenue and welfare of blenders who receive the subsidy.  
 
Assuming that cellulosic ethanol is less costly to produce ($2 per gallon at 16 billion 
gallons), with the tariff in place, the production of cellulosic ethanol is above the mandated level 
of cellulosic ethanol, at 18.57 billion gallons. Sugarcane ethanol imports total 1.43 billion 
gallons. However, once the tariff is removed, sugarcane ethanol displaces cellulosic ethanol in 
the advanced biofuel market, and also displaces domestic corn ethanol production. Cellulosic 
biofuel production goes down by 14%, while corn ethanol production goes down by 37%.  Once 
the subsidy to corn and sugarcane ethanol is removed, cellulosic ethanol takes market share from 
both biofuels, increasing in production to 18.43 billion gallons, while corn and sugarcane ethanol 
production decreases to 9.18 and 7.29 billion gallons, respectively.  
 
The last set of results show the case with cellulosic ethanol still at $2 per gallon, but the 
production cost of corn ethanol  decreases by 30%.  Several studies have shown that the 
production of biofuel has shown declining costs, as producers gain experience in production. 
Hettinga et al. (2009), study the evolution of corn ethanol production costs and concluded that 
from the early-1980 to 2005, production costs have decline by 60%. They estimate that in 2020, 
corn ethanol production cost could further decrease by 28-44% due solely to technical learning. 
We assume a cost reduction of 30% for corn ethanol. In this case, removing the tariff only causes 
displacement of cellulosic ethanol while corn ethanol production stays at its cap of 15 billion 
gallons. Removing the tax credit along with the tariff does not change the relative 
competitiveness of corn and sugarcane ethanol.  However, without the tax credit, cellulosic 
ethanol is more competitive with sugarcane ethanol, thus is it able to take market share away 
from sugarcane ethanol.  
 
 
A.2 Welfare Impacts 
 
 
The welfare changes due to the removal of the tariff accrue to ethanol producers, blenders 
and the government. Fuel consumers are not impacted by the removal of the tariff because the 12 
 
retail price of gasoline does not change due to the assumption that the biofuel mandate is 
binding.  
 
The removal of the tariff decreases the domestic price of ethanol, with blenders who 
purchase ethanol being the main beneficiary of the price decrease. In the scenario with no corn 
ethanol cost reduction and $3 cellulosic ethanol, blender surplus increases by 7.5 billion with the 
removal of the tariff, relative to the scenario with mandate, subsidies and tariff.  However this 
welfare gain is more than offset when the non-cellulosic tax credit is removed as well, because 
the wholesale price of ethanol increases. With the removal of the tariff, ethanol producer surplus 
declines due to the decrease in market share. This loss is further increased if the tax credit is also 
removed. Welfare loss is greatest in the case with low cost ($2 per gallon) cellulosic ethanol 
because removing the tariff and tax credit also leads to cellulosic ethanol taking some market 
share. 
 
When the cost of cellulosic ethanol is uncompetitive with sugarcane and/or corn ethanol, 
as is the case when the cost of production is $3, removing the tariff has no welfare effect on 
cellulosic ethanol producers since their production in all scenarios is equal to the mandated 
quantity. However, when cellulosic ethanol is competitive with  sugarcane ethanol, the tariff 
serves to "protect" the cellulosic ethanol market. Thus, removing the tariff reduces welfare of 
cellulosic ethanol producers. On the other hand, this loss is mitigated if the tax credit  for 
traditional biofuels is removed as well, since the tax credit increases the competitiveness of corn 
and sugarcane ethanol with cellulosic ethanol. 
 
The change in government revenue with the removal of the tariff depends on which 
domestic ethanol market the tariff is protecting. If the cellulosic industry is uncompetitive with 
the sugarcane ethanol industry, government revenue decreases with the removal of the tariff (due 
to lower tariff revenues). Government  revenues increase with the removal of the tariff and 
subsidy because the government's expenditures on the subsidy decrease. However, when the 
cellulosic industry is competitive with the sugarcane ethanol industry, government revenues 
increase with the removal of the tariff, because sugarcane ethanol replaces cellulosic ethanol. 
When this replacement occurs, the government does not have to subsidize cellulosic ethanol 
production above the mandate. Since the cellulosic ethanol subsidy is higher than the tariff per 
gallon ethanol, government revenue increases.  
 
In general, domestic welfare increases with the removal of the tariff.  However, the 
removal of the subsidy for corn and sugarcane ethanol  could reduce the welfare gains from 
removing the tariff. This occurs when the removal of the subsidy for traditional biofuels leads to 
an increase in cellulosic ethanol production. Welfare decreases, relative to the case when only 
the tariff is removed because the reduction in deadweight loss from the subsidy for traditional 
biofuels is offset by the increase in deadweight loss from the provision of cellulosic ethanol 
subsidy, which is greater than the tariff and tax credit.  Thus, from a purely social surplus 
perspective, it may not be beneficial to remove both the tariff and tax credit if a cellulosic 
subsidy is also in place.  
 
In terms of greenhouse gas emissions, the direction of the change is ambiguous when the 
tariff (and tax credit) is removed. When removing the tariff leads to sugarcane ethanol displacing 13 
 
mostly corn ethanol, as is the case when cellulosic ethanol is uncompetitive with other biofuels, 
greenhouse gas emissions decrease. On the other hand, when cellulosic ethanol competes with 
sugarcane ethanol in the advanced biofuel market, and removing the tariff causes cellulosic 
ethanol to be displaced by sugarcane ethanol, greenhouse gas emissions increase.  
 
The scenario with the mandate, subsidy, and tax credit yields the highest share of 
domestic fuel production. Removing the tariff leads to the lowest share of domestic fuel 
production. The effect of removing the tariff on fuel security is relatively large (5% decrease 
from 60% to 55%) in the case where sugarcane ethanol displaces both corn and cellulosic 
ethanol. In the case with a reduction in cost of corn ethanol production, the share of domestic 
fuel production is  fairly high in all policy scenarios, ranging from 58% to 60% because 
sugarcane ethanol does not displace corn ethanol in any of the policy scenarios. On the other 
hand, emission levels are also relatively high, compared to the case when corn ethanol has no 
learning advantage. This is because corn ethanol is more GHG intensive than sugarcane ethanol, 
so the lack of market displacement of corn ethanol with the removal of the tariff limits the 
emissions reduction that could be achieved. 
 
B. Sensitivity Analysis 
 
Tables 3 – 8 show selected results from the sensitivity analysis. The simulations show 
results assuming central parameter values for those parameters not being varied, and cellulosic 
ethanol production cost of $3 per gallon. Table 3 shows that if the excess supply elasticity of 
Brazilian sugarcane ethanol is lower (3 or 10), removing the tariff does not affect corn ethanol 
production. If the elasticity is 3, cellulosic ethanol production is above the mandate, with and 
without the tariff. When the elasticity is 10, removing the tariff decreases cellulosic ethanol 
production to the mandated level. This is in contrast to the central case, where removing the tariff 
does not impact cellulosic ethanol (which stays at 16 billion gallons), while removing the tariff 
decreases corn ethanol production. 
 
If the cost of cellulosic ethanol  is $2/gallon, and sugarcane ethanol excess supply 
elasticity is either 3 or 10, removing the tariff will not impact corn ethanol production, and will 
have little impact on cellulosic ethanol production. The welfare effects are also minimal. With 
cellulosic ethanol cost at $3, a low elasticity of sugarcane ethanol leads to an overall loss in 
domestic welfare when the tariff is removed (Table 4). This is different from the result of other 
scenarios, where the removal of the tariff almost always leads to a welfare gain.  When the tariff 
is removed, there is a slight decrease in the production of cellulosic ethanol which leads to a 
decrease in producer surplus. Government revenues also decrease due to the loss in the tariff 
revenue. However, because prices of advanced biofuel remain high (over $3) and do not drop 
with the removal of the tariff , blenders’ gain from the removal of the tariff in minimal, causing 
an overall loss in welfare. 
 
In terms of externality impacts, a lower elasticity of sugarcane ethanol leads to an 
increase in GHG emissions when the tariff is removed. This is because removing the tariff causes 
sugarcane ethanol to displace only cellulosic ethanol, thus leading to greater emissions. In 
addition, lower sugarcane ethanol elasticities also lead to a greater overall share of domestic fuel 14 
 
production, and a smaller impact of removing the tariff on the share of domestically produced 
fuel. 
 
Tables 5 and 6 show market and welfare changes when the supply elasticity of cellulosic 
ethanol is varied. With a cellulosic ethanol price of $3, differences in the supply elasticity of 
cellulosic ethanol do not affect the market outcome of removing the tariff since cellulosic ethanol 
production remains at 16 billion gallon in all scenarios. If cellulosic ethanol is priced at $2, and 
cellulosic ethanol is less elastic, the imports displaced by cellulosic ethanol when the tariff is 
removed is smaller. Because of the steeper supply curve, the loss of cellulosic ethanol producers 
is greater with a lower elasticity when the tariff is removed, although the change in quantity 
produced with and without the tariff is smaller. Blenders gain more because of the greater 
reduction in prices. In addition government revenues also decrease because of the reduction in 
tariff revenue. Total domestic welfare gain from the removal of the tariff is lower. On the other 
hand, if cellulosic ethanol supply is more elastic, there is greater displacement of cellulosic 
ethanol (and corn ethanol) when the tariff is removed. However, because the supply curve is 
flatter, the welfare loss is smaller.  In contrast to the less elastic case, government revenue 
increases with the removal of the tariff because there is a greater decrease in expenditures for 
subsidizing cellulosic ethanol. Domestic net welfare gain is larger. 
 
Table 7 and 8 show the market and welfare changes when the supply elasticity of corn 
ethanol is varied. Similar the case of cellulosic ethanol, a greater supply elasticity of corn ethanol 
leads to a greater reduction in corn ethanol production with the removal of the  tariff, and a 
greater increase in sugarcane ethanol imports. Welfare loss for corn ethanol producers and the 
government is smaller when the supply elasticity is flatter.  However, a flatter corn ethanol 
supply curve also means that blenders’ gain from the reduction in price is lower. Thus, there is 
no clear trend in the change in net domestic surplus. The greatest reduction in GHG emissions is 
achieved when corn ethanol is most elastic, because larger amounts of corn ethanol are displaced 






This study has demonstrated that in the presence of nested mandates, and different types 
of  biofuel, the market and welfare impact of removing the tariff is ambiguous. Generally, 
removing the tariff in the presence of a mandate leads to increased welfare, as the price of 
biofuels decreases. An exception is the case when the excess supply elasticity of sugarcane 
ethanol is not very elastic. In this case, removing the tariff increases the demand for cellulosic 
ethanol, which is costly and highly subsidized, thus leading to a net welfare loss.  
 
Depending on the relative cost of biofuels, the tariff could be protecting different biofuel 
markets. When the cost of cellulosic ethanol is high and not competitive with sugarcane ethanol, 
the tariff has no impact cellulosic ethanol production; it only protects the corn ethanol industry. 
However, when the cost of cellulosic ethanol is low and competitive with sugarcane ethanol, the 
tariff also serves to protect the cellulosic ethanol industry. 
 15 
 
Removing the tariff either maintains or decreases the share of domestically produced 
fuels. On the other hand, depending on which market the tariff protects, GHG emissions could 
increase or decrease. When the tariff is only protecting the corn ethanol market, GHG emissions 
decrease with the removal of the tariff. Conversely, when the tariff is only protecting the 
advanced biofuel market, GHG emissions increase with the removal of the tariff. When the tariff 
is protecting both the advanced and corn ethanol industry, the effect of removing the tariff on 
GHG emissions is ambiguous and would depend on the relative emissions intensities, as well as 
the quantity of traditional and advanced biofuel displaced by sugarcane ethanol. 
 
The results in this paper show that in terms of biofuel policy objectives, removing the 
tariff may not advance all of the goals of biofuel policy. Generally removing the tariff increases 
social surplus. However, it decreases the share of domestic fuel production and the effect on 
GHG emissions is ambiguous. Thus, if the government wants to increase energy security by 
increasing the share of domestic fuel production through protecting domestic industries with a 
tariff, it has to trade-off this benefit for lower social welfare and possibly higher emissions level. 
It may be impossible for one policy intervention to advance all the goals of bioenergy policy. 
However, a clear understanding of what goals are achieved by a particular policy intervention 
brings  us one step closer to designing a set bioenergy policies that achieves their stated 
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Figure 3. Domestic and world ethanol market 
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Figure 4. Effect of sugarcane supply elasticity on market outcome of removing tariff 




Figure 5. Domestic and world ethanol market with a competitive cellulosic industry 
  23 
 
Table 1. Market Effects of Removing Tariff and Traditional Biofuel Tax Credit 
Assumptions  Cellulosic Cost at 16 B: $3 
Corn ethanol cost reduction: 
0% 
Cellulosic Cost at 16 B: $2 
Corn ethanol cost reduction: 
0% 
Cellulosic Cost at 16 B: $2 
































Prices ($)*   
Corn  
Ethanol  2.08  1.71  2.16  2.08  1.71  2.14  1.47  1.47  1.92 
Imported 
Ethanol  2.23  1.71  2.16  2.15  1.71  2.14  2.15  1.65  2.07 
Cellulosic 
Ethanol  3  3  3  2.15  2  2.14  2.15  2  2.07 
Gasoline  1.76  1.76  1.76  1.76  1.76  1.76  1.76  1.76  1.76 






Demand  35  35  35  35  35  35  35  35  35 
Corn  








0.19  0.1  0.1  0.17  0.1  0.1  0.17  0.09  0.09 
Cellulosic 
Ethanol   16  16  16  18.57  16  18.43  18.57  16  17.23 
Gasoline 




62.54  62.54  62.54  62.54  62.54  62.54  62.54  62.54  62.54 
Gasoline 
Imports  63.38  63.38  63.38  63.38  63.38  63.38  63.38  63.38  63.38 
Externalities                   
GHG 
Emissions 
(B kg CO2) 





0.58  0.55  0.55  0.60  0.55  0.56  0.60  0.58  0.59 
*All prices are wholesale blender prices, except for fuel. 24 
 
Table 2. Welfare Effects of Removing Tariff and Traditional Biofuel Tax Credit (B US$) 
Assumptions  Cellulosic Cost at 16 B: $3 
Corn ethanol cost reduction: 
0% 
Cellulosic Cost at 16 B: $3 
Corn ethanol cost reduction: 
0% 
Cellulosic Cost at 16 B: $2 












































0.00  0.00    -2.64  -0.15    -2.64  -1.40 
Blender 
Surplus 
  7.50  -1.05    8.90  -0.87    3.56  -5.19 
Government 
Revenue 





0.91  0.91    2.57  1.23    1.60  1.43 
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Table 3. Sensitivity analysis: effect of sugarcane ethanol elasticity on market impacts 































Prices ($)*   
Corn  
Ethanol  2.08  2.08  2.53  2.08  2.08  2.53  2.08  1.71  2.16 
Imported 
Ethanol  3.27  3.27  3.28  3.16  2.85  3.13  2.23  1.71  2.16 
Cellulosic 
Ethanol  3.27  3.27  3.28  3.16  3  3.13  3  3  3 
Gasoline  1.76  1.76  1.76  1.76  1.76  1.76  1.76  1.76  1.76 






Demand  35  35  35  35  35  35  35  35  35 
Corn  








0.5  0.5  0.34  0.46  0.35  0.3  0.19  0.1  0.1 
Cellulosic 
Ethanol   19.47  19.46  19.63  18  16  17.58  16  16  16 
Gasoline 




62.54  62.54  62.54  62.54  62.54  62.54  62.54  62.54  62.54 
Gasoline 
Imports  63.38  63.38  63.38  63.38  63.38  63.38  63.38  63.38  63.38 
Externalities                   
GHG 
Emissions 
(B kg CO2) 





0.60  0.60  0.60  0.59  0.58  0.59  0.58  0.55  0.55 
*All prices are wholesale blender prices, except for fuel. 
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Table 4. Sensitivity analysis: effect of sugarcane ethanol elasticity on welfare impacts 
Assumptions  Sugarcane ethanol elasticity = 3  Sugarcane ethanol elasticity = 
10 




















































-0.006  6.819    0.20  7.17    -2.21  6.34 




-0.005  0.063    0.98  0.49    0.91  0.91 
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Table 5. Sensitivity analysis: effect of cellulosic ethanol elasticity on market impacts 































Prices ($)*   
Corn  
Ethanol  2.08  1.71  2.16  2.08  1.71  2.16  2.08  1.71  2.16 
Imported 
Ethanol  2.23  1.71  2.16  2.23  1.71  2.16  2.23  1.71  2.16 
Cellulosic 
Ethanol  3  3  3  3  3  3  3  3  3 
Gasoline  1.76  1.76  1.76  1.76  1.76  1.76  1.76  1.76  1.76 






Demand  35  35  35  35  35  35  35  35  35 
Corn  








0.19  0.1  0.1  0.19  0.1  0.1  0.19  0.1  0.1 
Cellulosic 
Ethanol   16  16  16  16  16  16  16  16  16 
Gasoline 




62.54  62.54  62.54  62.54  62.54  62.54  62.54  62.54  62.54 
Gasoline 
Imports  63.38  63.38  63.38  63.38  63.38  63.38  63.38  63.38  63.38 
Externalities                   
GHG 
Emissions 
(B kg CO2) 





0.58  0.55  0.55  0.58  0.55  0.55  0.58  0.55  0.55 
*All prices are wholesale blender prices, except for fuel. 28 
 
Table 6. Sensitivity analysis: effect of cellulosic ethanol elasticity on welfare impacts 
Assumptions  Cellulosic ethanol elasticity = 1  Cellulosic  ethanol elasticity = 
3 

































Corn  Ethanol 
Producer 





  0.00  0.00    0.00  0.00    0.00  0.00 
Blender 
Surplus    7.497  -1.053    7.50  -1.05    7.50  -1.05 
Government 
Revenue    -2.212  6.338    -2.21  6.34    -2.21  6.34 
Net  Domestic 
Welfare 
Change    0.911  0.911    0.91  0.91    0.91  0.91 
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Table 7. Sensitivity analysis: effect of corn ethanol elasticity on market impacts 































Prices ($)*   
Corn  
Ethanol  2.26  1.71  2.16  2.08  1.71  2.16  1.96  1.72  2.17 
Imported 
Ethanol  2.26  1.71  2.16  2.23  1.71  2.16  2.23  1.72  2.17 
Cellulosic 
Ethanol  3  3  3  3  3  3  3  3  3 
Gasoline  1.76  1.76  1.76  1.76  1.76  1.76  1.76  1.76  1.76 






Demand  35  35  35  35  35  35  35  35  35 
Corn  








0.19  0.1  0.1  0.19  0.1  0.1  0.19  0.1  0.1 
Cellulosic 
Ethanol   16  16  16  16  16  16  16  16  16 
Gasoline 




62.54  62.54  62.54  62.54  62.54  62.54  62.54  62.54  62.54 
Gasoline 
Imports  63.38  63.38  63.38  63.38  63.38  63.38  63.38  63.38  63.38 
Externalities                   
GHG 
Emissions 
(B kg CO2) 





0.57  0.55  0.55  0.58  0.55  0.55  0.58  0.54  0.54 
*All prices are wholesale blender prices, except for fuel. 
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Table 8. Sensitivity analysis: effect of corn ethanol elasticity on welfare impacts 











































0.00  0.00    0.00  0.00    0.00  0.00 
Blender Surplus 
 




-3.50  5.05    -2.21  6.34    -2.21  6.34 




0.67  0.67    0.91  0.91    0.64  0.64 
 
 
 